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STEVEN BOWMAN, HENRY J. BOWMAN,
SARA JUNE PETTERSON, and MICHAEL
BOWMAN, a minor, by June Bowman,
his Guardian,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
* * * *

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the Marie Dorothy
Wattis Trust, established by a trust agreement dated February 2,
1938, sued Defendants, as successor trustees, for alleged breaches
of trust resulting in losses to Plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court, sitting without a jury, granted a
judgment against the Defendants John and Dorothy Dussault in
the sum of $143,526.03.

It also granted a judgment against

Donald Bowman in the sum of $11,318.91 with an appendage granting
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-2Bowman total indemnity or contribution from the Defendants
Dussault.
Judgment was entered March 5, 1974, from which
Defendants Dussault appealed, Case No. 13657.

Defendant Bowman

did not appeal.
On May 20, 1975, this court reversed the judgment of
the trial court.

Two days following that decision of this court's

reversing the trial court's decision, Bowman filed his motion
in the trial court to vacate its judgment against him which
motion was granted by the court's ordering the judgment vacated
and granting a new trial to Donald Bowman.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court's
decision vacating the judgment against Donald Bowman and granting
him a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust suffered substantial
losses when corporate stock values declined in the early 1970's.
These losses were alleged to be the fault of the successor
trustees, John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault, and Respondent
Donald Bowman who had denied ever being a trustee.
After a lengthy trial of the matter, a judgment
was entered against the Defendants Dussault (who had done all
of the investing of trust funds) in the sum of $143,526.03.
Against Respondent Donald Bowman (who had never participated
directly or indirectly in the investment of trust funds) a
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-3judgment was entered in the sum of $11,318.91 appended to which
was a right of contribution or indemnification from Defendants
Dussault for the exact amount of the judgment against Bowman.
(R-10,11)

It was the clearly expressed intention of the court

that Bowman was to be held completely harmless because he had
acted in good faith (R-3) and, as the trial court stated in
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
This damage or loss is included in, and not
separate from, the damage to the trust suffered
by reason of the co-defendants John A. Dussault
and Dorothy Dussault. (R-8)
In other words, the total award to Plaintiffs/Appellants was to
be only $143,526.03, specifically included in which was the
Bowman liability of $11,318.91.
Defendant Bowman did not appeal his judgment to the
Supreme Court because he did not want to incur any additional
expenses to the Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust. Also, he relied
on the finding of the lower court that his judgment was but a
part of the judgment against the Dussaults which if reversed
would of necessity include a reversal of that portion of the
judgment pertaining to him.

If sustained, the appendage to

the judgment against him would serve to hold him harmless.
Consequently, he did not believe it necessary to incur any
additional expense by appealing.
On May 20, 1975, this court reversed the judgment
of the trial court on the grounds the trust instrument provided that the trustees were to be under no personal liability
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-4for security losses "...due to a falling stock market,"
Immediately following receipt of said decision, Donald Bowman
caused a motion to be filed with the trial court to vacate
the judgment against him.
After receiving memoranda of authorities from all
interested parties, the trial court vacated the $11,318.91 judgment against Bowman and granted him a new trial.

Referring to

this court's decision (No. 13657), the trial court stated
clearly its reason for vacating the judgment:
The Court hereby grants Donald W. Bowman
a new trial on the basis that the earlier
judgment was based on the Court finding that
Dussault had improperly caused losses.
The case was tried on that basis and the
Supreme Court has now ruled that Dussault1s
conduct does not make the Trustee liable. (R-19)
Plaintiffs/Appellants have appealed said order
vacating the judgment and granting a new trial with allegations
that the motion was untimely and that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to make such an order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO MAKE AND ENTER
ITS ORDER OF JANUARY 6, 1976.
Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. grants to a trial court broad
discretionary power to vacate a judgment.

It codifies long

standing rules of equity framed to prevent injustice from a
judgment based on a prior judgment which has been reversed,
or a judgment no longer equitable in regard to prospective
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5application, or a judgment inequitable for any other reason.
This Utah Rule is nearly identical to Rule 60 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The intended scope of the Rule is

probably best described by Justice Black of the U.S. Supreme
Court:
The Rule empowers courts to set aside judgments
under five traditional, specified types of
circumstances in which it would be inequitable
to permit a judgment to stand. But the draftsmen
of the Rule did not intend that these specified
grounds should prevent a granting of similar
relief in other situations where fairness might
require it. Accordingly, there was added a broad
sixth ground: "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment." Ackerman v.
U.S., 340 U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.ed. 207(1950)
Interpretation of the Utah Rule by this court has
resulted in a holding that a trial court may not act capriciously
or arbitrarily.

Kettner v. Snow, 13 U.2d 382, 375 P.2d 28(1962).

However, it has also been held that a trial court may exercise
wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and
public convenience and will be reversed "...only where an abuse
of this discretion is clearly shown."

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.

et al, 123 U.416, 260 P.2d 741(1953).
The technical arguments of Appellants that Dussaults1
judgment was neither prior to Bowman's, nor a separate and preceding
judgment from Bowman's, do not square with the court's own
statements—nor do they logically follow from Appellants1
insistance that Donald Bowman's acts were not only "separate and
distinct" but different from the acts of the Dussaults. The
trial court found and enumerated the judgments separately and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-6numbered them individually with Dussaults1 listed first, or
prior, and Bowman's second.

That fact alone should be sufficient

to distinguish the instant case from the Sixth Circuit case,
Berryhill v. U.S., 199 F.2d 217 (6th Cir.1952), which held that
a change in judicial view is not a basis for vacating a judgment.
More important, however, is the fact that Berryhill
was an attempt to rely on the reversal of another case in
another jurisdiction involving a similar question.

Our case at

hand, however, involves the same identical case, the same
jurisdiction and the same facts from which the judgments were
formed.

The finding of the court was that any possible damage

or loss occasioned by Donald Bowman was "...included in, and not
separate from, the damage to the trust suffered by reason of
the co-defendants John Ac Dussault and Dorothy Dussault."

(R-8)

Also, it should be emphatically noted that nobody realized more
clearly than the trial court that the imposed liability of
Donald Bowman was completely contingent upon the liability of
the Dussaults.

If the Dussaults had done nothing wrong, then

Donald Bowman's only sin was acquiescence in nothing wrong.
Consequently, a fair and proper interpretation of
subparagraphs (6) and (7) of Rule 60(b) should permit a trial
court to prevent the kind of injustice inherent in the judgment
against Donald Bowman.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN VACATING THE
JUDGMENT AGAINST DONALD W. BOWMAN.
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-7Contrary to the opinion of the Appellants/Plaintiffs,
the trial court was quite precise in stating its reason for
vacating the judgment against Donald Bowman.

In fact, it was

almost the language of subparagraph (6) of Rule 60(b).

The

court simply stated that Bowman's judgment was "... based on
the Court findings that Dussault had improperly caused losses."
(R-19)

When the Supreme Court held that Dussaults1 conduct had

not caused the losses, what else could the trial court do other
than conclude that acquiescence in non-liable conduct must
necessarily result in non-liable conduct?

To conclude otherwise

would have been most unjust and probably a clear abuse of
discretion because the primary and prior judgment against the
Dussaults had been reversed.
The facts of this case illustrate convincingly a
proper application of the power granted by the last clause of
subparagraph (6) and subparagraph (7) of Rule 60(b) which
authorize a court to vacate a judgment when "...it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or, (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment."

The anomaly of a possible non-application of

Rule 60(b) in the instant case is that Donald Bowman would be
unjustly punished.

This is especially true in light of the

previous finding of the trial court that
Donald Bowman has always acted in good faith
and is entitled to indemnification against
wrong-doing Trustees. (R-3)
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-8Appellantsf argument that the motion to vacate the
Bowman judgment was not filed within a reasonable time has its
basis in the inconsistent argument that the Dussault judgment
was not separate from nor prior to, and yet was "separate and
distinct".

If it were separate and distinct, it had to precede

the Bowman judgment—at least that is what the trial court said
and so held.
Such being the case, a reasonable time for filing a
motion for relief must toll from the day the prior judgment is
reversed—not the day of entry of the dependent or second
judgment,

Jackson v, Jackson, 276 F.2d 501 (D .C.Cir.1960) .

This test was clearly met in the instant case. Within one week
of the receipt of the Supreme Court decision reversing the
Dussault judgment, the Bowman motion for relief was filed.
The Annat and Ackerman cases cited by Appellants
represent a federal court stricture of the federal equivalent
of Rule 60(b) that could squeeze all life from said rule*

Most

reasonable men would wince at the inhumane conclusion in Annat
that
The fact that the judgment was erroneous does
not constitute "any other reason justifying
relief."
In that case a widow was barred from relief because
she failed to appeal a judgment based on an erroneous legal
description.

Annat v. Beard, 277 F.2d 554(5th Cir. 1960).

Ackerman involved the failure of a German national during
World War II to appeal from a denaturalization proceeding.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-9It was a five justice decision of the U. S. Supreme Court that
was caustically criticized by Justice Black in his dissent:
It does no good to have liberalizing rules like 60(b)
if, after they are written, their arteries are
hardened by this Court's resort to ancient
commonlaw concepts. Ackerman v. U.S., 340 U.S.
193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.ed. 207(1950).
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this court should
affirm the trial court's order vacating the judgment against
Respondent Donald W. Bowman.
Respectfully,

William J. Critchlow, III
2610 Washington Boulevard
P. 0. Box 107
Ogden, Utah 84402
Attorney for Respondent
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